Vaios Karavas & Gunther Teubner, Frankfurt

http://www.CompanyNameSucks.com: The Horizontal Effect
of Fundamental Rights on ‘Private Parties’ within Autonomous
Internet Law
I. Easy Cases - Hard Cases
1. Easy Case: ‘oil-of-elf.de’
In previous conflicts about domain names within the global address system, German
judges only had to answer relatively simply legal questions. Under which conditions
does a domain name, which is easily confused with another name, infringe the rights
of the name owner? Pervious decisions have identified infringement in the following
cases:
•

The name and domain name are, to a significant degree, identical or may be easily
confused with one another,

•

The user of the domain name possesses no personal right to the name, and

•

The name usage is likely to promote mistakes about the origin of the web-site.1

Apart from cases of identical names2 and of the use of generic concepts,3 which
demanded more differentiated juridical treatment, more complex, underlying
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Cf., Patrick Mayer, ‘Marke oder Meinungsfreiheit? Warum Greenpeace zu Recht die
Domain „oil-of-elf“ benutzt hat, available at
http://www.freedomforlinks.de/Pages/oil-of-elf.html.
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Cf., BGHZ 149, 191 – „shell.de“ and the commentary of Dietrich C. Becker, Von Namen
und Nummern – Zur Behandlung von Kollisionen unerträglicher Rechtsmassen im
Internet, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT, (Gunther Teubner/Christian Joerges
eds., forthcoming); Jörg Dittrich, Namensverletzung gem. § 12 BGB durch eine
Domain trotz Gleichnamigkeit, JurPC: INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
RECHTSINFORMATIK, Web-Dok. 144/2002, available at http://www.jurpc.de; M.
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considerations have rarely played a role, since rights could only ever be asserted in
very clear cases, for example, where the domain name user neither possessed a right
to the domain name, nor could make a justified case for its use.
The case of ‘oil-of-elf.de’ was to prove otherwise.4 The environmental protection
organisation, Greenpeace, had published comments critical of the environmental
policies of the TotalFinaElf oil company on a web-site with the domain name, ‘oil-ofoil-elf.de’. The company successfully requested an injunction from the Berlin High
Court (Landgericht).5 The Court gave its usual grounds for the decision. The domain,
‘oil-of-elf.de’, included the protected name, Elf, and so infringed upon the rights of
the oil company. The Berlin Appeal Court (Kammergericht), by contrast, found for
Greenpeace and lifted the injunction.6 The Court made it clear that consideration of
the immediate questions of name theft or potential confusion about name origin,
would not suffice for judgment. Instead, the primary question was one of whether, in
case of political conflict, an environmental organisation would be to use a domain
name incorporating targeted elements of the trademark of the oil company under
critical fire. In detail, the Appeal Court had to ascertain whether:

Körner, Gleichnamigkeitskonflikte bei Internet-Domain-Namen – Die „shell.de“
Entscheidung des BGH, NJW 3442 (2002).
3

Cf., on the use of generic concepts as domain names, ‘Mitwohnzentrale.de’, BGH, Judgment
of 17.05.2001 – I ZR 251/99 – , BGHZ 148, 13; for case notations, cf., Dietrich C.
Becker, supra note 2; Peer Zumbansen, Paving The Way For Cyberlaw: Two FCJ
Decisions on Domain Names, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2001), available at
www.germanlawjournal.com/printphp?id=28.
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Cf., for a comprehensive review of the history of the case:
http://archiv.greenpeace.de/GP_DOK_3P/BRENNPUN/F0011D.HTM.
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LG Berlin, Judgment of 18.01.2001 – 16.0.33/01,
http://archiv.greenpeace.de/GP_DOK_3P/BRENNPUN/F0011C6.PDF.
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Kammergericht, Judgment of 23.10.2001 – 5 U 101/01, JurPC: INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR RECHTSINFORMATIK, Web-Dok. 130/2002, http//www.jurpc.de.
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•

the domain name ‘oil-of-elf.de’ infringed upon TotalFinaElf’s name right at all;

•

and, where this was so, whether the critical usage of the Domain ‘oil-of-elf.de’
would not in this case be protected by free speech rights; as well as,

•

whether, in such conflicts, fundamental rights take precedence over simple trading
name and name rights (in other words, the underlying fundamental rights of
TotalFinaElf).

The Appeal Court concluded that there had been no infringement of the oil company’s
trading name, since both the wording and purpose of §15 MarkenG (Trademark Law)
were predicated upon abusive usage ‘within (normal) business relations’. Greenpeace,
by contrast, had acted within the remit of its associational status, and with solely
idealistic aims.
Neither did the name right provisions of §12 BGB (Civil Code) furnish increased
protection for trading names ‘outside’ the normal course of business. No damage to
interests was proven, since there was no confusion as to the origins of the web-site.
Even where search engines were used, the contents of the page were so
incontrovertible and clear as to dismiss any possible doubt as to their origins.
Informed web-users would naturally be aware of the large choice of search engines
available, such that they would also not be discouraged from undertaking further
searches for the web-site of the oil company, should their first search have led to the
Greenpeace web-site. In the opinion of the Court, the same would hold true for ‘MetaTags’ (e.g., Company key words) which facilitate web-site searches by search
engines.
A notable feature of the case, was the Court’s argument upon the application of
fundamental free speech rights to private actors within the Internet. This was the first
explicit application within Germany of fundamental rights to a private conflict on
domain names. In relation to the question of whether the oil company’s name had
been used ‘without authorisation’ under the terms of §12 BGB, the Appeal Court
brought the application of free speech rights to private parties within the Internet into
play. In this concrete case, the balancing of the free speech rights of an environmental
organisation (Art.5, para.1 GG [German Constitution]) against the fundamental
economic rights of an oil company (Art.12, para.1; Art.14, paea.1 GG) was resolved
3

in favour of the precedence of freedom of opinion. The core purpose of the
registration of the provocative domain name ‘oil-of-elf’ was to ensure greater public
awareness about environmental conflict and was thus, in the opinion of the Court,
protected by Art.5, para.1 GG.
American literature addresses such cases under the title SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation).7 Powerful economic actors deploy their trademark
rights, their name rights or copyright law in an effort to undermine potential political
critique.8 In this manner, political conflict on environmental protection and the
responsibility of German producers and consumers for environmental scandals in
(seemingly) faraway countries might yet find itself bogged down in the marshes of
German trademark and name law.9 Nonetheless, thanks to the Appeal Court,
Greenpeace was able to enforce its fundamental free speech rights in its attempts to
publicise the economic interests of Elf.
2. Hard Case: ‘oil-of-elf.com’
Now, however, for a small variation. What would the case have looked like had
Greenpeace Germany not registered the name, ‘oil-of-elf’, under the country specific
Top Level Domain (country code TLD), ‘de.’, but under the generic Top Level
Domain (generic TLD), ‘com.’, only then to be confronted with a claim by the French
Oil Company for dissolution or transference of the domain under the ICANN Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (in the following, UDRP)?
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See Patrick Mayer, supra note 1.
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Cf., from American jurisprudence, the ‘Scientology-case’, Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 923, F. Supp. 1231, (N. D. Ca. 1995); cf., on
conflict between copyright and free speech with regard to the aforementioned case,
Yochai Benklar, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999), at 356.
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See Patrick Mayer, supra note 1.
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Intuition tells us that the case would have been decided in the same manner. This,
however, is far from a given. In the first case, the decision falls to a State court, which
is bound by national law. In the second, the case would be heard by an Administrative
Panel of a private Dispute Resolution Organisation, such as the WIPO-Arbitration
Center, which is accredited by ICANN and which is obliged to adjudicate according
to UDRP and its explanatory rules, rather than in line with national law. Furthermore,
our case is far from being a hypothetical one. Administrative Panels have often been
called upon to adjudicate in cases similar to that of ‘oil-of-elf’; cases in which the
names of known concerns have been deployed, together with the affix ‘sucks’, on
web-sites, in an attempt to parody and/or critique the companies and their original
web-sites. To date, 35 ‘CompanyNameSucks’ cases have appeared before ICANN
Panels.
UDRP does not deal with country-specific domains and only allows complaints
against generic Top Level Domains (TLDs), such as ‘.com’, ‘.net’ and ‘.org’.10 UDRP
applies only to those domain conflicts in which a trademark owner claims the
existence of an abusive domain registration. In our particular case then, the Oil
Company TotalFinaElf would need to prove under §4a UDRP:
(i)

that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights;

(ii)

that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name;
and

(iii)

that the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith .

The UDRP conditions are cumulative.
ICANN Panel’ decisions on the danger of confusion are highly variable. The so-called
‘CompanyNameSucks’ cases are exemplary in this regard. In part, the Panels have
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Currently, UDRP has no application to domain names in the country-specific Top-LevelDomains (ccTLDs), with the exception of the country-specific Top Level Domains of
individual States (e.g., Tuvalu).
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grounded their findings of a danger of confusion in the argument that non-English
speaking internet-users will not understand the word ‘sucks’ as a critique or parody,
but as a word associated with the trademark or service mark of the complainant’s
domain.11 By contrast, other cases have seen the rejection of a danger of confusion
since use of the word ‘sucks’ makes the critical content of the web-site immediately
apparent.12 In our case, the similarity of the domain name ‘oil-of-elf’ to the
complainant firm’s trademark, ‘Elf-Oil’, is so great that a Panel might well find in
favour of a danger of confusion.
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Cf., for example, Société Accor contre M. Philippe Hartmann (D2001-0007): ‘under French
law, whether a trademark may be freely used for a parody is controversial ... in the
case of a public not speaking English, or even speaking some English but being
unfamiliar with the slang, the meaning of the word ‘sucks’ may not be understood,
nor its use in order to designate Web sites aimed at ‘cyberprotest’; Diageo plc v. John
Zuccarini, Individually and t/a Cupcake Patrol (D2000 – 0996): ‘As the Internet
extends far beyond the Anglophone world, a more difficult question arises as to
whether non-English speaking users of the Internet would be confused into believing
that such a site is owned and/or controlled by the Complainant. Because the word
‘sucks’ is a slang word with which all English speakers may not be familiar, this
Administrative Panel concludes that there may well be circumstances where Internet
users are not aware of the abusive connotations of the word and consequently
associate the domain name with the owner of the trademark’; National Westminster
Bank PLC v. Purge I.T. and Purge I.T. Ltd (D2000 – 0636); Caixa d’Estalvis y
Pensions de Barcelona ("La Caixa") v. Namezero.com (D2001-0360): ‘Although
converting "c"s into "k"s is a way of expressing feelings similar to those expressed by
the word "sucks" in English, this practice is part of a countercultural Latin jargon and
is unlikely to be understood by most Internet users throughout the world. They would
not understand LAKAIXA as a political parody of LA CAIXA, but as something
phonetically identical, and graphically confusingly similar, with respect to
Complainant’s world-famous trademark LA CAIXA.’
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Lockheed Martin Corporation v. Dan Parisi (D2000-1015); McLane Company, Inc. v. Fred
Craig (D2000-1455).
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The issue would therefore be one of whether the domain was registered in bad faith.
According to §4b UDRP, this decision is to be taken in line with the following nonexhaustive list of indicators:
(i)

the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for
purposes of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service
mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in
excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to
the domain name; or

(ii)

the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of
the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such
conduct; or

(iii)

the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)

the respondent has intentionally used the domain name to attract, for
commercial use, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line
location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent’s web
site or location or of a product or service on the respondent’s web site or
location.

§4c UDRP states that registration and use of the domain name (§4a (iii) UDRP) will
not be found to have been in bad faith where the domain name user possesses its own
rights in the name, or can show a justified interest in the domain name. This is the
case when:
(i)

before any notice of the dispute, the respondent has used or made
demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
or
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(ii)

the respondent has been commonly known by the domain name, even if he has
acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii)

the respondent is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

Do critical and protest sites fall under the jurisdiction of the UDRP? And must
ICANN Panels pay due regard to fundamental free speech rights? If this were the
case, the horizontal effects of fundamental rights would also apply against the firm,
Elf. It is often stated that ICANN Panels are not suitable fora for the consideration of
fundamental rights, and that the jurisdictional reach of the UDRP is restricted to cases
of abusive registration. However, and all such fevered critique notwithstanding,
ICANN Panels have concerned themselves with hot topics such as the conflict
between trademarks and freedom of opinion, and, in so doing, have noticeably
increased the jurisdictional reach of the UDRP; quite possibly since supposed
exceptions are more commonly the rule, while cases of cybersquatting are rare.
In some cases, ICANN panels have made explicit recourse to the term ‘free speech’,
albeit in vague and, legally-speaking, ineffective form, and have declared the
management of a domain name in the pursuit of political free speech to be legitimate.
In other cases, however, they have held critique and parody to be legitimate, but have
nonetheless banned individual critical domains.
3. Unanswered Questions
Which fundamental rights and which national legal order might the ICANN Panel in
our case call upon however? The argument that ICANN panels are not courts with an
adjudicative function, but mere administrative panels with a duty to oversee and
implement proceedings, does little to clarify matters.13 The so-called ‘Administrative
Panels’ do currently give final decision in the majority of legal disputes. Even though
there may yet be a possibility to involve a national court, this is seldom the case, and
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Cf., for example, Thorsten Bettinger, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, CR 234 (2000), at 235.
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the decisions of the Panels are also quickly and effectively implemented by electronic
means. Panel decisions are implemented by web-site’ registration and accreditation
providers (host providers), who contractually oblige themselves to abide by UDRP
provisions and also include them within their contracts with domain users. In line with
UDRP provisions, host providers transfer or dissolve a disputed site upon receipt of a
Panel Decision from an ICANN accredited Dispute Resolution Provider.
Although ICANN Panels apply UDRP provisions rather than State legal norms, they
often refer to US law. As a consequence, the First Amendment of the US Constitution
would be relevant to this case. In other words, the issue would be one of the
extraterritorial impacts of the US legal order upon the Internet. Following decades
dominated by the real-world cultural imperialism of the ‘American way of life’, are
we now witnessing a new expansion of the lex americana into the virtual world?14
The horizontal effects of fundamental rights on private actors would then be governed
by the ‘state action doctrine’ of the American Constitution.15
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Cf., Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD
POLITICS 333 (1973), at 344: ‘Transnationalism is the American way of expansion’.

15

Cf., for the general discussion of the application of the ‘state action doctrine’ to the Internet:
Paul S. Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of
Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COL. L. REV. 1263
(2000); Irene Dmitrieva, Will Tomorrow Be Free? Application of State Action
Doctrine to Private Internet Providers, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL 3
(Vogelsang/Compaine eds., 2000); Steven Gey, Reopening the Public Forum – From
Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1535 (1998); David Goldstone, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace
Speech, 69 U. COLOR. L. REV. 1 (1998); Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace:
Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Enviroment, 12 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 149 (1998). By contrast, the problem of the horizontal effect of fundamental
rights within the Internet seems to have troubled German doctrinal thought very little
at all, cf., the supplementary remarks of Karl H. Ladeur, Ausschluss von Teilnehmern
an Diskussionsforen im Internet, MMR 787 (2001); with regard to the blocking of
content by the host provider, cf., Rufus Pichler, Meinungsfreiheit, Kunstfreiheit und
neue Medien: Zwischen interessengerechter Auflösung von Rechtsgutkollisionen und
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As an alternative, however, the private international law principle that the relevant
national law ‘that the panel determines to be appropriate in the light of all of the
relevant circumstances’, as explicitly stated in the WIPO Final report (as well as §15
of the ICANN Rules16), might prevail. In such a case, the question would be one of
whether, in line with the applicable national conflicts rule, French private law, and
indirectly the French Constitution, or German private law together with the German
doctrine of horizontal direct effect would apply.17
There is also a third way, which might prove of particular interest with regard to the
Internet: are we seeing the development of an autonomous lex digitalis analogous to
the lex mercatoria, with its own autonomous ordre public transnational, in line with
which courts of arbitration would be required to develop internet-specific decisions on
fundamental rights and their horizontal effects within the Internet?
Our small variation from ‘.de’ to ‘.com’ has thus muddied the waters considerably.
We are potentially concerned here with a national fragmentation of Internet law,
which will allow for the application of national law to nationally defined TLDs. As
the press has reported, Google has already secretly begun to apply different
fundamental rights standards, at least to the degree that it has filtered out radical
political pages in French and German TLDs (‘.de’ and ‘.fr’) from its Google.de search
machine results, but still shows these contents on Google.com.18 But this is only the
start of our difficulties. The question in relation both to the non-nationally defined
TLDs, ‘.com’ etc. and, although to a lesser degree, to the national domains, such as

"Zensur", AfP 429 (1999), at 433; and Franz C. Mayer, Recht und Cyberspace, NJW
1782 (1996), at 1787.
16

§ 15 (a) ICANN Rules: ‘A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and
documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules
and principles of law that it deems applicable.’

17

On the problem of the law applicable to trademark conflicts in the Internet, cf., Annette
Kur, Territorialität versus Globalität – Kennzeichenkonflikte im Internet, WRB 935
(2000).

18

Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, 28.10.2002, at 46: ‘.com, .de oder .fr?’.
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‘.de’, is thus not simply one of whether horizontal direct effect is also applicable
within the virtual realm of the Internet. Instead, it is similarly one of which particular
national fundamental rights will be applicable in the light of collision of law
provisions. Even more troublesome, the issue is likewise one of whether the
transnational nature of the subject matter excludes application of the rules of private
international law altogether, such that conflict of laws provisions will demand the
development of autonomous, internet-specific, material norms on the horizontal
effects of fundamental rights.19 Additionally, problems arise with regard to the exact
legal status of those remarkable hybrid bodies of public and private law, the ICANN
Panels;20 as do final doubts about the legal quality of the rules that they apply to
fundamental rights issues within Cyberspace.
4. Theses
(1) Internet Appropriate Horizontal Effect
Under German law at least the digital horizontal effect of fundamental rights is
uncontested. But what impact does the term ‘indirect’ horizontal effect have in such a
context? We are not merely concerned here with the transmission of fundamental
rights through the general clauses of private law. Instead, the issue is one of the
autonomous reproduction of fundamental rights within the independent logic of the
social system of the Internet.

19

Cf., on the development of material norms in private international law see generally
Gerhard Kegel/Klaus Schurig, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, (6th Edition),
First Section, §8 III4, Materiellprivatrechtliche Lösungen im IPR, at 269; E.
Steindorff, SACHNORMEN IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1958).

20

Cf., on this question, Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons
Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION SOCIETY 211 (C. T. Mardsen ed. 2000); see with regard to ICANN,
Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private, Comments Before
Congress, 14 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. (1999), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol14/Zittrain/html/reader.html.
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(2) Applicability of Fundamental Rights within Autonomous Internet Law
The question of whether ICANN Panels should or, indeed, ‘may’, also enforce
fundamental rights against private parties within the realm of the semi-autonomous
legal order of ICANN-policy is, however, a highly contentious one. The thesis on this
point is as follows: ICANN Panels concretise fundamental rights within Cyberspace
on the basis of a fiction. They draw upon the fiction of a ‘common core’ of globally
applicable principles of law, which include fundamental and human rights, and with
their help concretise internet-specific fundamental rights within the reaches of a
‘common law’ of the Internet.
II. Digital Horizontal Effect in German Law
1. ‘Indirect’ Horizontal Effect within the Internet
In our first case of ‘oil-of-elf.de’, where the application of German Law is not
contested, conventional horizontal effect doctrines seem to present few problems: the
notion of the ‘indirect’ horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law is surely
founded on firm doctrinal ground. Nonetheless, recent, and ever more trenchant
criticism of this doctrine, in particular, private law critiques, might require us to cast
our ‘easy case’ in a different light, especially if horizontal effect against third parties
is to be included within the ‘new-type’ jurisdiction of the Internet. But what is the
meaning of ‘indirect’ horizontal effect in this context? The currently predominant
view, which rejects the ‘direct’ transformation of fundamental into subjective private
legal rights, and which instead seeks ‘indirect’ transposition through the general
clauses of private law is, simply-stated, inadequate.21 Concerned only with the

21

Cf., for a small representative overview of the, by now inaccessibly bulky, literature on the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights, Hans D. Jarass, Die Grundrechte:
Abwehrrechte und objektive Grundsatznormen. Objektive Grundrechtsgehalte,
insbes. Schutzpflichten und privatrechtsgestaltende Wirkung, in FESTSCHRIFT 50
JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 35 (Badura/Horst Dreier eds., 2001);
Claus W. Canaris, GRUNDRECHTE UND PRIVATRECHT: EINE
ZWISCHENBILANZ (1999); Uwe Diederichsen, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als
oberstes Zivilgericht, AcP 171 (1998); ibidem, Die Selbstbehauptung des Privatrechts

12

integrity of private law doctrine, such a view fails even to notice the two questions
which are determinative for horizontal effect in non-statal social spheres: (1) which
particular risks do the internal dynamics of each social sphere pose to autonomy; and
(2), in which consequent manner must fundamental rights be reconstructed within
each social sphere, such that they might act as effective foil to that sphere’s internal

gegenüber dem Grundgesetz, JA 57 (1997); Dieter Medicus, DER GRUNDSATZ
DER VERHÄLTNISMÄSSIGKEIT IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT (1997);
Eike Schmidt, Verfassungsgerichtliche Einwirkungen auf zivilistische
Grundprinzipien und Institutionen, KritV 424 (1995); Johannes Hager, Grundrechte
im Privatrecht, JZ 373 (1994); Stephan Oeter, Drittwirkung der Grundrechte und die
Autonomie des Privatrechts, AöR 529 (1994); Konrad Hesse,
VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND PRIVATRECHT (1988); Robert Alexy, THEORIE
DER GRUNDRECHTE 475 (1985); Walter Leisner, GRUNDRECHTE UND
PRIVATRECHT (1960); Guenther Dürig, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtssprechung, in
VOM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ ZUR GESAMTDEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNG,
FS. H. NAWIASKY 157 (1956). Newer theories on fundamental rights doctrine
which approach the problem of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights as a ‘multipolar legal relationship’ (mehrpolige Grundrechtsverhältnis), or seek to re-interpret
the issue as a triangular relationship between State (State, Administration, Justice
System) and the two parties in conflict, are nonetheless inappropriate, deriving as
they do from the narrow public law perspective of the transposition of the political
constitution to society. Cf., with particular regard to this point, Christian Calliess,
RECHTSSTAAT UND UMWELTSTAAT – ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR
GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK IM RAHMEN MEHRPOLIGER
VERFASSUNGSRECHTSVERHÄLTNISSE (2001) and Matthias Ruffert,
VORRANG DER VERFASSUNG UND EIGENSTÄNDIGKEIT DES
PRIVATRECHTS – EINE VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG
ZUR PRIVATRECHTSWIRKUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES (2001). For a systems
theory informed critique, cf., Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller
Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in der Kollision unverträglicher
Handlungslogiken, KritV 388 (2000); from the perspective of democracy theory,
Oliver Gerstenberg, Verfassung und die Grenzen judizieller Sozialregulierung, in
VERANTWORTUNG IN RECHT UND MORAL 141 (Ulrich Neumann/Lorenz
Schulz eds., 2000).
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dynamics? The extension of the statally-conceived fundamental rights relationship to
the context of private governance regimes, cannot simply be based upon ‘private-lawappropriate’ formulations, but must instead be founded within ‘social-systemappropriate’ reformulation of all of the elements of the classical fundamental rights
model: individual-state-power-subjective law.22 This is an issue tackled in more detail
elsewhere.23 With regard to the social sphere of the economy, however, such a
transformation of fundamental rights is already far advanced since endeavours have
been made to respond to the dangers posed to fundamental rights by market processes
through the ‘market-appropriate’ reformulation of fundamental rights. The same holds
true for fundamental rights risks in formally organised social spheres, which doctrine
has sought to combat through the ‘organisation-appropriate’ proceduralisation of
fundamental rights.
Within the social sphere of the Internet, by contrast, such questions—a necessary precondition for the ‘internet-specific’ constituting of fundamental rights—have yet to be
posed. Here, the famously touted ‘Internet Code’, the digitalised embodiment of
norms of conduct within the architecture of Cyberspace, becomes the central focus for

22

Christoph Graber and Gunther Teubner attempt such an approach in the private context of
artistic freedom, cf., Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere,
OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 61 (1998). Cf., for the English debate
on fundamental rights in the private context, Andrew Clapham, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1996); Hugh Collins, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL
(1992); Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); W. N. Nelson,
Human Rights and Human Obligations, 23 NOMOS 281 (1981).

23

Gunther Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten
Verfassungstheorie, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT (2003); ibidem, Vertragswelten: Das Recht in der
Fragmentierung von Private Governance Regimes, RECHTSHISTORISCHES
JOURNAL 234 (1998), at 257; Christoph Graber/Gunther Teubner, see supra, note
22.
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attention.24 Initially, the question is one of the specific risks inherent to fundamental
rights within the Internet: which particular dangers do the Code’s rules of conduct
pose to individual autonomy? Further, how does the Code perceive of the autonomy
of economic institutions? Then comes the question of how it is best to reconstruct
fundamental rights in a manner appropriate to the network: what subject matter and
which procedural codes must be read into the Code in order to ensure that individual
fundamental rights and institutional spheres of autonomy are adequately protected
against digital manifestations of legal norms?
This is not primarily a matter of the misuse of digital power positions. Rather, the
issue is one of the consequences for fundamental rights of the structural differences
between ‘Code’ and ‘law’. The effort to reformulate the horizontal effect doctrine
must take the basic structures of the Internet into account. Within its borders, the
Code founds a new basis for the normative ordering of the symbolic realm of the
Internet, because the conduct of network participants is regulated by the electronic
constraints of Network Protocols rather than by legal norms. What impact does the
reorientation from ‘legal norms’ to ‘Network Protocols’ have upon the Internet
Communication Constitution (decisions and forms of argument) and on individual and
institutional autonomy (fundamental rights)? What dangers does the ‘digital
embodiment of law’ pose to fundamental rights?
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2. Code-Specific Risks to Fundamental Rights and Code-Specific
Fundamental Rights Protection
An initial answer is derived from the ‘self-enforcing’ character of the code.
Predominantly instrumentalist-interventionist Internet lawyers, might well view this
as being the great advantage of the Code;25 it is nonetheless the bugbear of the
traditional rule-of-law-based State (Rechtsstaat). Traditional law is founded in correct
procedures and clear distinctions between law production, the application of law and
its coercive enforcement. This is also to a large part true for law making processes in
the private sector. Digitalisation, however, appears to have effected a form of fission
between law-making, application and enforcement. With this, the constitutional
division of powers within legal processes evaporates, taking with it an important
guarantee for individual and institutional spheres of autonomy.
A second indicator derives from the ‘conduct-control, expectation-building and
conflict-resolution’ triad.26 Traditional law cannot be limited to any one of these
functions, but effects all three, albeit in a disassociated form, with each function
served by its own institutions, own legal culture and own form of rule of law. This
division likewise embodies a (secret) constitutional guarantee for social autonomy.
Higher normative prescriptions that facilitate conflict resolution, do not necessarily
require institutionalisation as socially effective expectations; nor yet must they always
be translated into real world conduct. However, the Code’s digital embodiment of
legal norms nonetheless reduces this triad to a single function of electronic conduct
control, and so dissolves the autonomy securing buffer zones between conflict norms,
expectation norms and conduct norms. The Internet Code dispenses with the civilising
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Seen from this instrumentalist point of view, the differences beween the two protagonists of
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achievement of disassociation and with the constitutional/rule-of-law based securing
of each of the three functions within the triad.
A further aspect of the Code that has potential relevance to fundamental rights is its
exact mode of calculating normativity. Traditionally speaking, much vaunted legal
formalism was only ever partially possible. The—either much admired or much
feared by lawyers—impact of conventional legal formalism is, however, as nothing
when compared to the extent of digitalisation achieved by the code, which has per
force given rise to an as yet unheard of degree of norm formality. The strict binary
formulation, 0-1, which is only relevant to a real world legal code in the systems
theoretical sense of the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’, extends, in a
virtual world of legal programmes, to inform legal decision-making in its entirety.
This precludes any room for interpretational manoeuvre within the programmes
throughout the entire jurisdiction of the Code. Normative conduct expectations, which
could always be interpreted, adapted, manipulated or bent, are becoming rigid
cognitive expectations of factual circumstances (inclusion/exclusion). The esoteric
forms of learning, which were always to be found in the permanent microvarations of
law in the face of new facts or new social values, are excluded from the Code. Even
legal arguments are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Code. Arguments can only
be made at the time of the Code’s promulgation or its official amendment, and no
longer influence the day-to-day legal task of the interpretation, application and
implementation of norms. At core, this means that all informality is excluded from the
jurisdictional reach of the Code. The Code has no room for those functions that were
always allowed within traditional law: the making of exemptions, the application of
equitable principles, the non-application of law, or, the simple recourse to non-legal
forms of communication. Digitalisation precludes the informal non-application of the
Code. Given the demise of ‘useful illegality’, it is no wonder that the figure of the
Hacker who endeavours to break the Code has become the modern embodiment of the
Robin Hood myth.
If this is a true impression of the dangers that the Code poses to autonomy, then the
constitutional character of various legal policy demands made of the code is
undeniable. The Open-Source-Movement, which demands publication of the Source
Code in software marketing materials so that programme control structures can
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always be checked, should not simply be dismissed as a bunch of ‘nice’ idealists.27
Equally, Lessing’s demand that the Code’s digitalised conduct control mechanisms be
subject to the principle of ‘narrow tailoring’, entails a parallel demand for intensified
application of the principle of constitutional proportionality to the Code, in order to
bring it in line with legal norms that must also be respected by private actors. In this
context, Judicial control, as well as other forms of public control over the meta-norms
of the Code are far more important than comparable oversight of standard contract
terms or the terms used by private associations in the real world. The same holds true
for internet competition law, which not only secures open markets, but also impacts
upon the continued openness of alternative Code regulations.
To return to our original case: naturally, not all of these Code-specific risks to
autonomy are relevant to the ‘oil-of-elf’ conflict. Instead, other issues, in particular,
access to Internet Providers and the selectivity of search machines, to name but two,
must also be considered. Nonetheless, we can identify some internet-specific risks to
fundamental rights and internet-adequate reactions within the CompanyNameSucks
cases, which do have an influence on conflict resolution. The intensity of the conflict
between name and trade name owner and its opponent is particularly marked within
the Internet. The domain name system does not allow for the same degree of nameusage flexibility as does a real world, in which the legitimate use of trademarks and
names can be differentiated along product, market and regional lines, such that
multiple name-usage is often conflict free. The Internet, can only provide one global
address in the Top Level Domain. Equally, differentiation between different TLDs is
inadequate compensation for this deficit. In addition, such Code-specific monopoly
effects are only intensified by the widespread practice of ‘reverse domain hijacking’,
against which there is no judicial recourse. In addition to registering their own
companyname, concerns also register companynamesucks, companynamereallysucks,
companynamereallyreallysucks, etc. in the effort fully to secure both the core and
periphery of the semantic reach of their name. The social cushioning effects of ‘useful
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illegality’ cannot be relied upon in this context. Once ICANN approved host
providers have authorised IP Addresses or domain names, or, once the decisions of
the ICANN Panels have been electronically implemented, there follows an automatic
process within the Internet, which no longer tolerates a grey zone between ‘illegal’
yet, pragmatically-speaking, ‘allowable’ name-usage.
In addition to risks to fundamental rights, our introductory case also raises internetspecific questions in relation to the content of fundamental rights protection. The
question is one of how a public sphere can be created within the decentralised realm
of the Internet at all. How can critique of FinaTotalElf’s company policy be
transmitted to the appropriate audience? The search is on for internet-specific
equivalents to the mass media, on the one hand, and to those local protest movements,
on the other, who can enforce fundamental rights protection for their criticisms of
trade-practice against the company’s place of business. In principle, the company’s
web-site is the equivalent of the company’s place of business in the real world, and
the domain name, the determinative locus for the creation of a public sphere of
political debate on the company. This is the primary argument in support of the
extension of fundamental rights protection to parodies or critiques of the company’s
trademark.
III. Digital Horizontal Effect within the UDRP?
Once again, we American panellists have tended to assume that American
jurisprudence and American Constitutional protections should be given
precedence on the Internet.28
Scott Donahey, Panellist
So, what is the situation as regards the digital horizontal effect of fundamental rights
within the UDRP?29 A case decided by an ICANN Panel provides us with an initial
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Cf., Scott M. Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP and the Need for Appellate Review,
(2002), available at http://udrplaw.net/DonaheyPaper.htm.
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picture of the problem. In the precedent-setting case, Bridgestone Firestone et al v.
Jack Myers (D2000-0190), the Panel stated:
[A]lthough free speech is not listed as one of the Policy’s examples of a right or
legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not exclusive, and the panel
concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary also
demonstrates a right or legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph
4 (c)(iii). The Internet is above all a framework for global communication, and
the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of internet law.
This is an explicit acceptance by the ICANN Panel of the digital jurisdiction of
fundamental rights. But what are such often reproduced professions of the creed of
fundamental rights founded upon? On which legal basis do they rest? The obiter of
the ICANN Panels remains opaque and vague on this point. To be sure, there is clarity
that the use of a domain name in pursuit of the right to free speech is a legitimate and
founded interest under Paragraph 4(c)(iii). However, there is no indication of the legal
wellspring of the free speech rights to which the Panels refer.
Is the First Amendment of the American Constitution the source of decisions that
make use of such formulas as, ‘free speech doctrines’, ‘inalienable freedom of speech
and expression’, or simply, ‘free speech’? Certainly, ICANN Panels do orient
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themselves in line with US jurisprudence and legislation. This is often the case when
the conflict is strongly connected with the US legal order. Thus, the Panel in the
foregoing case noted that:
in applying the definition of abusive registration ... in the administrative
procedure, the panel of decision-makers appointed in the procedure shall, to the
extent necessary, make reference to the law or rule of laws that it determines to
be applicable in view of the circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, if the
parties to the procedure were resident in one country, the domain name was
registered through a registrar in that country and the evidence of bad faith
registration and use of the domain name related to activity in the same country,
it would be appropriate for the decision-maker to refer to the law of the country
concerned in applying the definition.
The panel interpretation seems also to comply with the provisions of the WIPO ‘Final
Report’. The WIPO ‘Final Report’ states that:
the consequence of this would be that people in countries with strong protection
for freedom of expression would have greater protection in the WIPO
alternative dispute resolution than would people from, for example, North
Korea.30
It might nonetheless be doubted whether the division of the Internet into distinct
spheres of influence for national protection standards is at all desirable, at least in the
case of generic TLDs. In addition, solutions founded in conflicts rules would also
greatly overwhelm the information processing capacities of the ICANN Panels.31
Can we accordingly argue that ICANN Panels are wholly inappropriate fora for cases
entailing fundamental rights issues? This, for example is the opinion of Blackman,
who accepts that fundamental rights must be given horizontal effect in such contexts,
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but argues that ICANN Panels are institutionally unsuited to such decisions.32 He
furthermore suggests that jurisdiction should be refused for ‘hard cases’ and the
complainant directed to national courts: ‘the court system is the only viable institution
that can resolve these questions’.33 Blackman’s approach is, in large part, justified. He
nonetheless pays insufficient regard to the foundations upon which such a
transnational system of arbitration must be built. The division between ‘easy cases’
and ‘hard cases’ would lead, in the vast majority of conflicts—very few of which are
clear cases of ‘cybersquatting’—to full-scale withdrawal of the ICANN-Panel
jurisdiction, fatally undermining the advantages of this alternative dispute resolution
system. Accordingly, we must look to wholly different mechanisms of effective
control over ICANN Panel’ decisions.
IV. ‘Ordre public transnational’ of the ‘lex mercatoria’ and of the ‘lex
digitalis’?
1. An Autonomous Legal Order?
Brief consideration of the paradigmatic case of a non-statal autonomous legal order
with a transnational jurisdiction, the famous lex mercatoria, proves valuable here. Can
comparison with the ordre public transnational of international economic law furnish
us with hooks upon which to hang our solution to the problem of the horizontal effect
of fundamental rights in the private sphere of the Internet? In order to avoid all
misunderstandings from the very outset: in neither case are we concerned with
autarky, or a self-sufficient legal order which is isolated from political regulation and
rests solely upon self-regulation. Both the lex digitalis and the lex mercatoria are
clearly hybrid rule-systems, each with their own particular portions of autonomous
law, national law and international law.34 Not even a global Bukowina can fully free
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itself from the influences of the metropolis, but is instead, to use a popular metaphor,
a ‘semi autonomous social field’.35
In addition, however, the lex mercatoria has historically been long acquainted with
passionate doctrinal and legal theoretical debate on its ‘legal quality’ and has built up
extensive experience of international dispute resolution. In rebuff to all statist
critiques, which once dismissed the lex mercatoria as a ‘phantom of theorising
Sorbonne professors’ and held the existence of elements of a non-statal, and at the
same time ‘a-national’ law to be wholly inconceivable, not least the current economic
success of the lex mercatoria has now surely secured its recognition as an
autonomous legal order.36 Are the most advanced definitions of the lex mercatoria
now applicable to the lex digitalis? Can the following four characteristics be identified
within ICANN Panel practice?
(i)

‘[a] third-level autonomous legal system beyond municipal and public
international law’ with a claim to global validity;

(ii)

which is ‘created and developed by the law-making forces of an emerging
global civil society’;

processes? The hypothesis also seems to be well founded in legal experience that a
global economic law is developing along all three dimensions. Of course, this
presupposes a pluralistic theory of norm production which treats political, legal and
social law production on an equal footing’, cf., Gunther Teubner, Globale Bukowina:
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3,
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997), at 11.
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(iii)

which is ‘founded on general principles of law as well as social usages’; and

(iv)

which is ‘administered by private dispute resolution service providers and
codifies (if at all) by private norm formulating agencies’.37

Rather than open up a discussion at this point on the fundamental issue of whether a
‘global Bukowina’ is also to be found in Cyberspace, the analysis moves on to
compare the legal quality each rule system. The question to be clarified is one of
whether the jurisdiction of the far more problematic lex digitalis is more or less
closely related to traditional legal phenomena that the, in the meanwhile, far more
firmly established lex mercatoria.
Both systems are concerned with a process of conflict resolution to which both parties
have given their consent. Both are distinguished from simple arbitration systems in
that a third party gives binding decisions. In contrast to ‘equitable arbitration’,
decisions are neither taken on equitable grounds alone, nor are they given on no
grounds at all. Rather, ICANN Panels apply, lege artis, the norms of the UDRP,
which in content and method appears identical to the application of ‘real’ legal norms.
Just as in international economic conflict resolution, an elaborated process of norm
application gives final judgment on the legality/illegality of the desired conduct.
Findings regularly include the requisite elements of factual analysis, interpretation of
norms and the subsuming of facts under norms.
Each case concerns a non-statal and ‘a-national’ system of rule application. The
jurisdiction of the lex mercatoria includes contracts, business practices, standard
contract terms, restatements of law (unidroit principles of international economic law,
the Lando ‘common core’ principles of European contract law) and the decisions
taken by courts of arbitration. The lex digitalis is likewise founded within the private
autonomous acts of internet-users, the explicit rules of the UDRP, the ‘Rules for
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’ as well as the individual ‘Supplementary Rules’
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of ICANN accredited ‘Dispute Resolution Providers’, and, finally, the Decisions of
ICANN Panels.
Each web of rules has a far stronger affinity with common law than with continental
codified law. They expand incrementally through individual decisions and precedent.
Neither system plays host to a uniform hierarchy of decisional instances, but both
display a prominent reliance upon heterarchical references to other courts of
arbitration, as is common in the courts of countries applying ‘common law’.
International economic law plays host to mutual inter-citation between courts of
arbitration and, in particular between the ‘Big Three’ (New York, Paris, Tehran); a
process which is strengthened by the endeavours of legal science to distil uniform
legal principles and norms from the decisions of the different courts of arbitration.
Here, however, the first real differences between the systems can be identified. While
the smooth development of the lex mercatoria into a genuine common law is
hampered by the fact that cases cannot be decided publicly and by the fact that very
few are published in case reports or journals, and then only in summary form, ICANN
Panel practice presents us with far stronger indicators of its evolution to a proper caselaw.38 Many Panel decisions are published on the Internet and can be referred to in
legal debate on practice and doctrine. ICANN Panels themselves make explicit
reference to decided cases and strictly follow, though without formally pre-empting
their decisions, stare decisis in cases of precedent. They also distinguish facts and
overrule case-law norms.
To be sure, the practice of the lex digitalis gives rise to the same high degree of
decisional inconsistency that has long been notorious within national courtrooms
when the lex mercatoria has made an appearance.39 However, although it is, currently
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at least, unrealistic to hope for a hierarchy of courts and for more decisional
consistency within international economic arbitration, the Internet has far greater
potential in this regard. Legal debates have already suggested that an important step in
the evolution of this hybrid legal order would be the establishment of an appeal
instance within the ICANN arbitration jurisdiction, which would seek to create
consistency out of the many diverging decisions to be found in practice.40
The legal quality of the lex digitialis is also far stronger than that of the lex mercatoria
in a further respect. The legal nature of international economic arbitration is often
doubted since it does not apply sufficiently precise decisional norms and instead
resorts to insufficiently transcribed rules, vague directions and general principles. By
contrast—a requirement of the Code—the decisional norms of ICANN Judges are
characterised by their highly explicit nature, their careful transcription and their
factual precision. This is true both for UDRP rules and for the decisions of the Panels
themselves.
Political legitimacy is undoubtedly the Achilles heal of both autonomous legal
systems. In principle, neither can claim to be linked into the usual legitimation chain
of democratic will creation—though this is also true for large parts of the national
legal order whose legal character is nonetheless not doubted. At best, traces of
political legitimation can be found within the lex mercatoria. The New York
Convention provides for a degree of legitimation for international arbitration in
international law. Ironically, however, this does not increase, but instead restricts the
potential for public democratic control over autonomous law-making. By contrast, the
lex digitalis can lay claim to a far stronger chain of political legitimation in the
character of periodically renewed agreements between ICANN and the US
Department of Economics.41 Further political legitimation can be derived from the
process whereby the rules of the UDRP are laid down. At the behest of the US
Government, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) organised an
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extensive international consultation process, whose preliminary findings were then, in
large part, used by the non-profit organisation, ICANN, as the basis for its own
private norm production.
The greatest differences between the lex digitalis and the lex mercatoria are to be
found in relation to the sanctions applied by them and the carrying through,
enforcement and implementation of their decisions. Taking its key from authors as
diverse as Austin, Weber and Kelsen, traditional legal theory measures legal character
against the yardstick of sanctions. Here we find the strongest objection to the
autonomous nature of the lex mercatoria: when it comes to it, the informal sanctions
applied by the market are not sufficient and recognition must be given to decisions by
national courts in order to ensure implementation through national jurisdictions. The
very core of its legal quality is thus placed in doubt. The situation is wholly different
as regards Internet enforcement. Following a ten-day period, during which the parties
have the possibility to approach formal courts, the ICANN Panels give notice to the
‘Registrar’ directly to execute their decisions electronically. The Registrar either
deletes the entry or transfers the domain name to the complainant with direct legal
effect.
Comparison leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion. The practices of still
adolescent ICANN Panels, the precedent system and the nature of the norms applied,
taken together with their stronger degree of political legitimation and, above all, the
mode in which their decisions are effectively enforced, furnish the lex digitalis with a
far stronger degree of legal quality than that provided by the practices of a by now old
and treasured lex mercatoria, whose recognition as an autonomous legal order by
national courts and international legal doctrine, although not complete, is, at the very
least, far more developed.
2. The Validity of Fundamental Rights in an Autonomous Legal Regime?
With this, the lex digitalis counts, together with the lex mercatoria and other
autonomous legal regimes, as one of those legal phenomena, which have cast the
globalisation of law in a light very different from the usual one. Globalisation is thus
not simply a matter of the unification, harmonisation, or, at the very least, the
convergence of legal orders, but is, instead, one of a dramatic change in the
27

differentiations made within the legal system itself. Traditionally, the global legal
order is divided into relatively autonomous national legal orders. Today, such
distinctions have not become redundant, but have instead been overlaid by a different
principle of differentiation: the law is also divided into autonomous transnational
legal regimes, which define their jurisdiction along ‘issue-specific’ rather than
territorial lines, and which lay claim to global validity.42 Regardless of whether they
are founded within the private contractual relationships of transnational actors or
whether they are hybrid in nature, such systems are genuine legal regimes (and not
just political or economic compendiums, or a loose ensemble of social norms), since
they possess their own constitutional institutions, which reflexively normatise their
norm-making processes. In other words, their primary norm-making processes are
subject to the autonomous procedures of secondary decision-making and normatising
processes, which establish the legal quality of primary norms.43
It is this secondary, constitutional normatising process which decides the question of
the validity of fundamental rights within autonomous Internet law. A comparative
glance at the lex mercatoria is one again valuable. It is of course evident that the lex
mercatoria is founded within private contractual relationships and that it is these
contrats sans loi that form the basis both for its material norms and for the
institutionalisation of international courts of arbitration. Nonetheless, this leaves the
system facing a seemingly insoluble dilemma: if the lex mercatoria educes from a
private contract, how can it enforce fundamental rights as mandatory law against the
wishes of the parties to the contract? As a consequence of this, the existence of
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mandatory law within the lex mercatoria has been doubted. Wholly pragmatically,
however, and without any consideration of underlying theoretical legal issues, courts
of arbitration have evolved a practice, which might prove to be a future model for the
lex digitalis:
It is generally recognized that the arbitrator can, in the name of ‘truly
international public policy,’ refuse to give effect to certain agreements of the
parties. Likewise, if the object of a law is to guarantee the respect of principles
the arbitral tribunal considers as forming a part of transnational or ‘truly’
international public policy, it must find that such law prevails over the will of
the parties.
The content of transnational public policy is not well-defined. It is usually
paraphrased as ‘fundamental principles of civilized nations’. These principles
may encompass ... basic procedural and conflict principles, prohibition of
unlawful expropriations, and the refusal to recognize the effect of corporate
personality in certain situations of abuse .... [and] violations of human rights,
drug dealing, or terrorism as violations of transnational public policy.44
In this case, a secondary constitutional normatising process swings into action,
looking beyond the traditional reach of contracts, business practices, standard terms,
‘restatements of law’ and guiding arbitration principles, to seek ‘rules of recognition’
for the lex mercatoria within the ‘fundamental principles of civilised nations’; rules
that then facilitate the identification of enforceable fundamental rights within the
autonomous legal order.45
Of course, both we, and practitioners of the lex mercatoria, are wholly aware that
recourse to the enforceable nature of the ‘fundamental principles of civilised nations’
is a fiction without firm foundation in either natural law or the universal or relativistic
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philosophies of human rights theory. Such fictions, however, are a necessary starting
point for the case-law based concretisation of fundamental rights within each legal
regime. In a more positive formulation: they furnish courts of arbitration with a
semantic material which, although it possesses no real legal character of its own,
allows for the concrete anchoring of fundamental rights within the lex mercatoria or
the lex digitalis.
The enforceable nature of fundamental rights within the Internet educes from two
sources: on the one hand, the fiction of a ‘common core’ of ‘fundamental principles of
civilised nations’; on the other, the norm concretising effects of arbitration decisions,
which, much in the manner of common law, construct and constitute a catalogue of
enforceable fundamental rights within the autonomous legal regime of the Internet,
adapting rights created to suit conditions within national and statal orders, in order to
combat specific digital dangers to autonomy and to take advantage of specific digital
opportunities for fundamental rights development.
This provides us with indicators of how to resolve fundamental rights conflicts
between national orders within the Internet. Such conflicts have been caused within
the law of domain name recognition by the registration of names such as
bundesinnenministerium.com

(internalministry.com)

and

verfassungsschutz.org

(constitutionalprotection.org) by Nazi organisations.46 It is no longer appropriate to
apportion such disputes to a conflicts law, which is required to identify the
jurisdictional reach of each national set of fundamental rights criteria in order to find a
solution within only one of the relevant legal orders. The arbitrary nature of the
choice of only one national standard of fundamental rights protection within the
Internet is clear. ICANN judges would be much better advised to seek and develop

46

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) v. RJG Engineering Inc.Case
(D2001-1401); Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Republic of Germany) v. RJG
Engineering Inc./Gerhard Lauck (D2002-0110).
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their own, Internet-wide applicable, standards of rights protection in reflexive debate
with their own epistemic community and general public opinion.47

47

Empirical studies by social scientists such as Michael Geist, in particular, have kindled a
lively debate on the decisional practice of ICANN-Panels, Michael Geist, Fair.com?
An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in ICANN UDRP, (August
2001), available at http://aix1u0ttawy.ca/~geist/.
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